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NOTES 
PRELIMINARY  CONFERENCE 


ON 


CONDUCT  OF  WAR 


BY 

LIEUTENANT  COLONEL  W.  A.  HOLBROOK 

CAVALRY 
Assistant  Commandant 

The  Army  Service  Schools 

Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas 


FORT  LEAVENWORTH: 


1916 


NOTES 
PRELIMINARY  CONFERENCE 


ON 


CONDUCT  OF  WAR 


BY 

LIEUTENANT  COLONEL  \V.  A.  HOLBROOK 

CAVALRY 


Assistant  Commandant 

The  Army  Service  Schools 

Fort  Leacentcortb.  Kama* 


FORT  LEAVEN  WORTH 


press 


1916 


tfj? 


Notes      Preliminary  Conference 
on  Conduct  of  War 

BY 
LIEUT.  ('Oj,oNEi,  W.  A.  HOJJHKOOK.  Cavalry 


TT^HIS  subject  is  of  very  great  interest  at  the 
present  time,  not  only  on  account  of  the  tre- 
mendous struggle  now  in  progress  in  the  Old  World, 
but  also  because  there  is  a  growing  belief  that  the 
U.  S.  will  have  occasion  to  put  its  principles  into 
practice  in  the  not  distant  future. 

The  book  used  as  a  text  for  these  conferences 
is  little  more  than  an  outline  of  a  subject  which  has 
been  more  exhaustively  treated  by  many  other 
writers.  Among  these  the  best  known  is  Clause- 
witz,  whose  writings  followed  close  upon  the  Napol- 
eonic wars.  Although  he  spent  twelve  years  in  this 
work  he  never  completed  it  to  his  satisfaction.  The 
manuscript  left  by  him  was,  however,  finally  pub- 
lished in  the  exact  shape  in  which  it  was  found. 
Clausewitz,  who  has  given  us  this  most  profound 
analysis  of  war,  is  perhaps  more  responsible  than 
any  other  man,  for  the  trend  of  modern  military 
thought  iii  Europe,  and,  according  to  Colonel  Maude, 
furnishes  the  key  to  the  interpretation  of  German 
political  aims— past,  present  and  future.  He  reveals 
war,  stripped  of  all  accessories,  as  the  exercise  of 
force  for  the  attainment  of  a  political  object,  unre- 
strained by  any  law  save  that  of  expediency.  That 
expediency  is  the  controlling  law  in  the  present  war, 
is  shown  by  the  ruthless  way  in  which  treaties  have 
5 

357286 


been  disregarded  and  the  sovereignty  of  neutral  na- 
tions violated. 

Colonel  Maude  says  that  what  Darwin  did  1'or 
Biology,  Clausewitz  did  for  the  Life  History  of  Na- 
tions nearly  half  a  century  before  him;  for  both  have 
proven  the  existence  of  the  same  law— the  survival 
of  the  fittest.  By  filttest,  is  not  to  be  understood 
those  ethically  best,  but  rather  those  most  able  to 
carry  on  the  struggle  for  physical  existence.  Neither 
of  these  writers  was  concerned  with  the  ethics  of 
the  struggle.  To  both,  the  phase  or  condition  pre- 
sented itself  neither  as  moral  or  immoral  any  more 
than  are  famine  or  disease,  but  as  emanating  from 
.a  force  inherent  in  all  living  organisms  and  which 
can  only  be  mastered  by  understanding  its  nature. 
Likewise,  when  we  consider  war  in  its  connection 
with  the  lives  of  nations,  we  come  to  look  upon  it 
merely  as  an  instrument  in  working  out  the  same 
great  law  of  nature  which  applies  to  all  forms  of 
life  — individual  or  national  —  the  survival  of  the 
fittest. 

I  speak  of  Clausewitz  thus  at  length  because 
from  his  writings,  and  from  those  of  his  school,  can 
be  gleaned  the  thoughts  which,  it  appears,  are  to- 
day a  living  and  perhaps  a  determining  force  in  the 
activities  of  most  great  nations. 

Among  these  thoughts  are  found  the  following: 

Clausewitz: 

"Victory  can  only  be  insured  by  the  creation,  in 
peace,  of  an  organization  which  will  bring  every  avail- 
able man,  horse  and  gun,  in  the  shortest  time,  and 
with  the  utmost  momentum,  upon  the  decisive  field  of 
battle." 

Von  der  Goltz: 

•'The  best  military  organization  is  that  which 
makes  all  the  intellectual  and  material  resources  of  a 
nation  available  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  a  war  to 
a  successful  issue. " 


Von  der  Goltz: 

"The  statesman  who,  knowing  his  instrument  to 
be  ready  and  seeing  war  inevitable,  hesitates  to  strik* 
first  is  guilty  of  a  crime  against  his  country.7' 

Lea,: 

4 -For  a  nation  to  suffer  defeat  through  unpre- 
paredness,  is  to  all  practical  purposes  as  though  it 
were  on  the  field  of  battle." 

i4The  self-deception  of  a  nation  concerning  its 
true  military  strength  increases  at  the  same  rate  as  its 
actual  militant  capacity  decreases. " 

1 'Nations  that  expect  to  war  in  the  future  with 
hastily  raised  levies  of  volunteers  against  standing 
armies  are  doomed  to  death.'1 

tlA  man  who  enlists  in  the  army  has  the  right  to 
demand  that  those  who  are  his  leaders  shall  know  to 
the  fullest  extent  the  duties  appertaining  to  their 
office.1' 

'•The  most  promiscuous  murderer  in  the  world  is 
the  ignorant  military  officer.  He  slaughters  his  men 
oy  bullets,  by  disease,  by  neglect;  he  starves  them,  he 
makes  cowards  of  them  and  deserters  and  criminals." 

We  may  not  agree  with  the  ethics  of  all  the 
above  quotations,  but  so  long  as  they  are  advanced 
as  rules  of  conduct  by  leading  writers  we  must  give 
them  due  consideration.  It  is  likely  that  ethical 
considerations  of  civilization  will,  in  the  future,  as 
they  have  done  in  the  past,  give  way  to  the  neces- 
sities of  the  case  where  the  life  of  the  nation  is  at 
stake.  Hence  in  the  discussion  of  war  we  must 
treat  it  as  a  condition  neither  moral  nor  immoral,  but 
as  a  natural  phenomenon  incident  to  the  struggle  for 
existence  which  all  living  things  must  undergo. 

It  is  in  this  spirit  that  the  nations  of  the  conti- 
nent, taught  by  drastic  lessons,  have  accepted  the 
teachings  with  the  result  that  Europe  became  an 


armed  camp.  Peace  was  maintained  by  an  equilib- 
rium of  forces,  the  Unstable  nature  of  which  was 
recognized,  and  for  years  military  writers  have  been 
picturing  it  as  tottering  to  its  fall.  We  are  witnesses 
of  its  destruction.  It  must  be  reestablished  after 
the  present  war,  or  the  countries  of  Europe  must 
submit  to  the  domination  of  the  victor. 

The  present  war  is  not,  as  some  have  thought, 
the  unexpected  struggle  arising  from  a  comparatively 
trivial  incident  in  Serbia.  Such  incidents  are  often 
made  the  occasion  for  war,  but  the  causes  will  as  a 
rule  be  found  deep  seated  and  of  long  duration. 
Most  wars  of  the  present  day  are  brought  about  by  a 
gradual  change  in  economic  conditions. 

In  his  book,  "America  and  the  World's  War," 
Roosevelt,  after  stating  that  it  is  a  crime  against  our 
nation  not  to  be  prepared  so  as  to  guard  ourselves 
and  hold  our  own  in  war,  goes  on  to  show  that  it  is 
possible  to  make  out  a  case  in  favor  of  every  nation 
engaged  in  the  present  war.  He  says  in  effect: 

The  English  feel  they  fight  not  only  for  them- 
selves but  for  justice,  civilization  and  lasting  peace. 
Russia  regards  the  welfare  of  her  whole  people  as  at 
stake,  and  that  success  means  an  end  of  militarism 
in  Europe;  that  the  conflict  was  essential  to  growth 
of  freedom  and  justice.  The  Germans  believe  they 
are  in  a  fight  for  life — Teuton  against  Slav — civiliza- 
tion against  what  they  regard  as  a  menacing  flood 
of  barbarism.  They  believe  the  war  was  an  absolute 
necessity  to  German  national  existence;  believe  they 
are  fighting  for  the  existence  of  generations  yet  to 
come.  The  French  feel,  with  passionate  conviction, 
that  this  is  the  last  stand  of  France.  If  she  fails 
now,  she  will  lose  for  all  time  her  place  in  the  fore- 
front of  modern  civilization. 

Of    Austria-Hungary,  Serbia   and   Montenegro, 


the  same  is  true.  To  each  of  these  peoples  the  war 
seems  a  crusade  for  justice  and  right.  France  and 
England  believe  their  existence  is  at  stake,  and  that  it 
depends  upon  the  destruction  of  the  German  men- 
ace; while  Germany  believes  that,  unless  she  can 
cripple  the  western  powers,  she  cannot  protect  her- 
self against  the  mighty  Slav  people. 


Last  year  I  attended  a  dinner  at  the  Commer- 
cial Club,  Kansas  City.  One  of  the  speakers,  after 
paying  a  tribute  to  commerce,  went  on  to  say  that 
commerce  was  the  foundation  of  civilization.  That 
by  means  of  accumulated  wealth  resulting  from  com- 
merce, communities  are  able  to  build  churches  and 
schoolhouses,  establish  parks,  museums,  art  gal- 
leries, and  bring  into  being  all  the  attributes  of  the 
city  beautiful.  The  next  speaker  got  up  and  said 
that  business  is  civilization.  By  the  same  token  it 
might  have  been  stated  that  civilization  is  war.  I 
believe  it  is  possible  of  demonstration  that  a  high 
degree  of  civilization,  as  measured  by  the  standards 
of  business,  and  a  long  continued  peace  are  incom- 
patible. 

Civilization  creates  new  wants  and  goes  hand  in 
hand  with  invention.  Labor-saving  machines  result 
and  the  products  of  labor  are  greatly  multiplied. 
This  causes  abnormal  consumption  of  natural  re- 
sources which  must  be  supplemented  from  outside 
sources,  and  the  surplus  products  of  manufacture 
demand  outside  markets  and  safe  lines  of  transpor- 
tation thereto. 

As  long  as  a  country  has  plenty  of  room  within 
its  own  borders,  little  attention  is  paid  to  outside 
markets;  but  when  the  density  of  population  in- 
creases greatly  and  natural  resources  are  becoming 
exhausted,  or  when  a  large  surplus  production 


—10— 

awaits  a  market,  the  search  begins;  When  more 
than  one  nation  is  so  situated,  competition  arises. 
War  is  the  logical  result  of  extreme  competition 
which,  in  some  cases,  may  be  averted  or  postponed 
by  diplomacy  backed  by  proper  military  preparation. 

Adams,  in  his  book  'The  New  Empire,"  in  a 
study  of  trade  routes  from  earliest  times,  arrives  at 
the  same  conclusion.  He  starts  with  the  propositions 
that:  (a)  Self-preservation  is  the  most  imperious  of 
instincts  and  (b)  that  in  his  efforts  to  prolong  life 
man  has  followed  the  lines  of  least  resistance. 

'  'Without  food  or  the  means  of  defense  death  is 
inevitable.  Few  communities  have  succeeded  in  en- 
tirely feeding  and  arming  themselves  from  their  own 
resources  and  they  have  supplied  their  deficiencies 
from  abroad.  No  man  will  knowingly  use  inferior 
weapons  in  war,  but  the  apprehension  of  want  is 
almost  as  drastic  as  the  fear  of  defeat.  Even 
savages  try  to  improve  their  tools.  For  example,  in 
the  stone  age  inhabitants  of  Central  Europe  im- 
ported jade  axes  from  the  confines  of  the  Desert  of 
Gobi  because  jade  takes  a  better  edge  than  flint.  The 
cost  of  conveying  jade  from  Khotan  to  Germany 
represented  prodigious  sacrifice.  From  the  begin- 
ning men  have  obtained  wares  from  strangers." 
Thus  we  see  built  up  trade  routes,  rivalry,  competi- 
tion, war.  Such  has  been  the  history  from  the  be- 
ginning, and  such  it  is  likely  to  continue  until  the 
end. 

If  we  examine  the  situation  in  Europe  at  the  out- 
break of  the  present  war,  we  find  that  Germany's 
208,000  square  miles  were  crowded  to  a  density  of  311 
per  square  mile,  and  that  the  population  was  increasing 
at  the  rate  of  more  than  1,000,000  per  year.  It  did  not 
require  the  gift  of  prophecy  to  foretell  that  one  day  it 
would  have  to  burst  its  bonds  in  order  to  find  an 


—11— 

outlet  for  its  teeming  millions.  On  one  side  we 
find  Germany's  neighbors  of  a  density  of  20  per 
square  mile;  on  the  other,  a  density  of  191.  When  the 
flood  of  population  reaches  such  a  height  over  the 
lower  levels  all  around,  great  indeed  must  be  the 
artificial  barriers  to  keep  the  lowlands  from  being 
inundated.  The  break  would  naturally  be  through 
the  line  of  least  resistance.  No  nation  of  Europe 
wanted  to  be  responsible  for  that  least  line.  So  we 
find  the  artificial  barriers  being  constantly  raised 
higher,  until  Europe  has,  for  years,  been  described 
as  groaning  under  excessive  military  burdens. 

If  we  care  to  pursue  the  examination,  we  will 
find  that  practically  all  the  uninhabited  portions  of 
the  globe  have  been  parcelled  out  among  the  nations 
of  the  earth  whose  density  of  population  was  fast 
reaching  the  safety  limit.  England,  with  a  home 
density  of  376  per  square  mile,  had  acquired  13,123,- 
000  square  miles  of  colonial  territory.  France  with 
a  home  density  of  191  per  square  mile,  had  acquired 
4,165,000  square  miles.  Belgium,  with  a  density  of 
666,  had  added  913, 000  square  miles,  or  ninety  times 
the  home  area.  Germany  with  a  home  density  of 
311,  had  colonial  territory  aggregating  1,026,000 
square  miles.  Russia,  with  a  home  density  of  20 
per  square  mile,  needed  none,  and  had  few  colonies. 
It  will  be  seen  that  Germany's  colonial  possessions 
relative  to  population  were  comparatively  small,  and 
they  were  located  in  a  portion  of  the  earth  not  well 
suited  to  the  white  man.  Since  the  Franco-Prussian 
War  the  industrial  growth  of  Germany  has  surpassed 
all  belief.  Production  has  far  outrun  its  growth  in 
population.  This  great  production  has  resulted  in 
an  unusual  demand  for  natural  resources,  which 
means  a  corresponding  demand  for  more  territory 
and  wider  markets. 


—12— 

There  are  two  ways  in  which  a  nation,  whose 
population  has  become  overcrowded,  provides  for  its 
maintenance.  First,  by  increasing  the  intensity  of 
cultivation  so  that  larger  crops  may  be  produced 
from  the  same  area.  This  Germany  has  done  in  a 
marvelous  degree,  and  yet  is  scarcely  able  to  supply 
the  wants  of  the  present  population,  leaving  no 
margin  for  the  increase  of  future  generations.  Sec- 
ond, by  engaging  a  considerable  portion  of  its  popu- 
lation in  manufacturing  industries  and  exchanging 
surplus  products  for  additional  food  supplies.  This, 
too,  Germany  has  done  in  a  manner  to  bring  un- 
precedented prosperity  to  the  country.  This  situa- 
tion, however,  demands  larger  natural  resources, 
and  Germany  has  been  looking  for  what  she  terms 
"her  place  in  the  sun,"  and  in  this  way  we  may 
find  one  of  the  causes  of  the  present  war. . 

Homer  Lea  has  attempted  to  formulate  a  law  of 
natural  progress:  "A  nation,  in  order  to  preserve 
its  equilibrium  between  over  industrial  production 
and  under  political  development,  should  withdraw 
from  industrial  occupations,  for  military  purposes,  a 
portion  of  the  male  population.  First,  not  greater 
than  what  labor-saving  inventions  can,  by  being 
substituted  therefor,  more  than  replace  by  increased 
productive  energy.  Second,  the  number  of  men  so 
withdrawn  not  to  be  more  nor  less  than  that  number 
which  is  deemed  imperative  to  acquire  and  to  hold 
whatever  additional  national  resources  are  necessary 
for  the  increasing  productivity  of  the  nation."  He 
says:  "Productive  energy  increases  in  geometrical 
ratio  to  increase  of  civilization.  Resources  of  a 
country  diminish  in  increased  ratio  to  the  increase  of 
both  population  and  productive  energy." 

Germany  has  kept  well  within  the  stated  law 
so  far  as  her  standing  army  is  concerned.  It  has 


—13— 

even  been  demonstrated  that  the  devotion  of  a  large 
number  of  her  male  population  to  military  pursuits 
has  proved  to  be  an  asset,  rather  than  a  liability,  in 
her  material  development.  It  is  said  that  those 
who  serve  in  the  army  have  more  than  the  time  so 
served  made  up  to  them  by  increased  longevity;  also, 
the  services  of  each  such  man  are  considered,  in 
civil  life,  worth  about  $100  per  year  more,  by  reason 
of  the  training  and  discipline  he  has  received. 

INTRODUCTION  TO   VON   DBR  GOLTZ 

In  the  introduction  to  his  treatise  on  the  Con- 
duct of  War,  the  author  impresses  tfpon  us  the  fact 
that  it  is  impossible  to  discover  two  situations  ex- 
actly similar;  and  that,  even  if  we  did,  the  personal 
equation  of  those  concerned  in  carrying  them  out 
would  be  so  different  that  the  application  of  even 
unquestioned  rules  for  the  Conduct  of  War  would 
and  could  not  be  expected  to  produce  constant  re- 
sults. Of  the  truth  of  this  there  can  be  no  doubt; 
and  it  is  possible,  too,  that  book  learning  may  lead 
us  into  the  error  of  overestimating  the  value  of  cast 
iron  rules  of  generalship  and  the  extent  of  our  own 
knowledge.  There  are  many  people  ready,  however, 
to  keep  a  commander  from  falling  into  error.  I 
read,  over  a  year  ago,  when  von  Hindenburg  was 
making  his  drive  in  the  Mazurian  Lake  region,  that 
he  received  about  two  baskets  full  of  letters  daily, 
advising  him  how  to  conduct  the  campaign. 

It  is  not  alone  in  modern  times  that  those  who 
have  least  to  do  in  making  war  profess  the  greatest 
knowledge  of  the  art.  For  in  the  days  of  the  Ro- 
mans we  hear  the  Roman  general,  about  to  depart 
for  the  war,  calling  upon  any  such  as  claimed  to  have 
special  knowledge,  to  come  with  him  and  demon- 
strate their  knowledge  in  the  field  or  refrain,  while 


—14— 

sitting  at  home,  from  indulging  in  criticisms   of  the 
campaign. 

A  ROMAN  GENERAL'S  OPINION  OF  "MILITARY  CRITICS" 

Lucius  Aemilius,  a  Roman  consul,  who  had  been 
selected  to  conduct  the  war  with  the  Macedonians, 
B.  C.  168,  went  out  from  the  Senate  House  into  the 
assembly  of  the  people  and  addressed  them  as  follows: 

"In  every  circle,  and,  truly,  at  every  table,  there 
are  people  who  lead  armies  into  Macedonia;  who 
know  where  the  army  ought  to  be  placed ;  what  posts 
ought  to  be  occupied  by  troops;  when  and  through 
what  pass  Macedonia  should  be  entered ;  where  mag- 
azines should  be  formed;  how  provisions  should  be 
conveyed  by  land  and  sea;  and  when  it  is  proper  to 
engage  the  enemy,  when  to  lie  quiet.  And  they  not 
only  determine  what  is  best  to  be  done,  but  if  any- 
thing is  done  in  any  other  manner  than  what  they 
have  pointed  out,  they  arraign  the  consul,  as  if  he 
were  on  trial.  These  are  great  impediments  to  those 
who  have  the  management  of  affairs;  for  everyone 
cannot  encounter  injurious  reports  with  the  same  con- 
stancy and  firmness  of  mind  as  Fabius  did,  who  chose 
to  let  his  own  authority  be  diminished  through  the 
folly  of  the  people,  rather  than  to  mismanage  the 
public  business  with  a  high  reputation.  I  am  not  one 
of  those  who  think  that  commanders  ought  never  to 
receive  advice;  on  the  contrary,  I  should  deem  that 
man  more  proud  than  wise,  who  did  everything  of  his 
own  single  judgment.  What  then  is  my  opinion? 
That  commanders  should  be  counselled,  chiefly,  by 
persons  of  known  talent;  by  those,  especially,  who 
are  skilled  in  the  art  of  war,  and  who  have  been 
taught  by  experience;  and,  next,  by  those  who  are 
present  at  the  scene  of  action,  who  see  the  country, 
who  see  the  enemy;  who  see  the  advantages  that  oc- 
casions offer,  and  who,  embarked,  as  it  were,  in  the 
same  ship,  are  sharers  of  the  danger.  If,  therefore, 
any  one  thinks  himself  qualified  to  give  advice  re- 
specting the  war  which  I  am  to  conduct,  which  may 
prove  advantageous  to  the  public,  let  him  not  refuse 
his  assistance  to  the  state,  but  let  him  come  with  me 
into  Macedonia.  He  shall  be  furnished  by  me  with  a 
ship,  a  horse,  a  tent;  and  even  with  his  travelling 
charges.  But  if  he  thinks  this  too  much  trouble,  and 
prefers  the  repose  of  a  city  life  to  the  toils  of  war,  let 
him  not,  on  land,  assume  the  office  of  a  pilot.  The 
<*ity,  in  itself,  furnishes  abundance  of  topics  for  con- 


—15— 

versation  ;  let  it  confine  its  passion  for  talking,  and 
rest  assured,  that  we  shall  be  content  with  such  coun  - 
cils  as  shall  be  framed  within  our  camp." 

,  BookXLIV,  Chapter  L-J. 


The  fact  that  bare  theory  may  sometimes  lead 
us  into  error  does  not,  however,  give  us  excuse  for 
neglecting  theoretical  work.  Wolseley,  while  ex- 
pressing the  hope  that  his  officers  will  not  become 
book-worms,  goes  on  to  say  that  none  of  them  need 
hope  to  rise  to  distinction  unless  they  spend  many 
hours  a  week  in  close  study.  General  Sherman  used 
to  tell  us  that  war  was  the  best  school-  but  when 
war  was  not  available  military  schools  must  be  sub- 
stituted. We  are  at  present  so  far  removed,  in 
point  of  time,  from  any  great  war  of  the  past  that 
we  are  unable  by  direct  contact  with  the  actors  to 
gain  the  necessary  knowledge.  We  therefore  study 
their  work  and  the  conclusions  drawn  from  it  enun- 
ciated by  students  of  military  history. 

As  we  study  the  war  now  in  progress  we  are 
impressed  with  the  great  importance  attached  to 
rapidity  of  mobilization  and  concentration.  In 
countries  ready  for  war  these  matters  have  been 
worked  out  in  the  greatest  detail.  But  as  they  are 
part  of  the  conduct  of  war  that  can  be  provided  for 
in  time  of  peace,  the  author  has  omitted  their  dis- 
cussion in  the  present  treatise. 

It  is,  however,  of  much  interest  to  note  the 
great  preparations  made  in  Western  Europe  to  gain 
the  advantage  that  comes  from  rapidity  in  these 
things.  The  railway  net  of  Germany  that  provides 
seventeen  strategical  R.  R.  lines  to  the  Russian 
frontier  shows  the  importance  she  has  attached  to 
this  subject.  Untold  millions  have  been  expended 
in  the  construction  of  strategic  railways  and  in  the 
completion  of  her  railway  net. 

But  war  has  to  be  carried  on  sometimes  where 


— 16— 

railways  are  few  or  nonexistent  and  therefore  the 
author  begins  his  work  after  concentration  is  com- 
pleted, which,  in  spite  of  the  important  role  played 
by  the  plans  of  mobilization  and  concentration,  re- 
mains the  most  important  part  of  the  war.  This 
work,  therefore,  excluding  the  system  of  intelligence, 
the  publication  and  transmission  of  orders,  limits 
itself  to  a  discussion  of  the  various  ways  of  manipu- 
lating troops  that  can  be  used  in  war. 

THE    RELATION    IN     WHICH  WAR   STANDS 
TO  SOCIETY 

The  governments  of  all  civilized  nations  main- 
tain permanent  diplomatic  missions  to  regulate  their 
political  relations  one  with  another.  These  missions 
are  largely  engaged  in  smoothing  out  the  difficulties 
that  arise  between  them.  A  large  part  of  our  peo- 
ple have  indulged  the  vain  hope  that  all  differences 
might  be  so  determined  and,  as  a  means  to  bring  this 
about,  arrangements  have  been  made  between  many 
countries  providing  for  the  submission  of  their  differ- 
ences to  courts  of  arbitration.  The  Peace  Confer- 
ences at  the  Hague  have  encouraged  the  world  to 
believe  that  in  them  was  to  be  found  the  means  of 
avoiding  war,  and  many  have  held  to  this  idea  with 
pathetic  determination.  Doubtless  many  differences 
of  a  minor  nature,  which  do  not  affect  the  honor  or 
the  existence  of  nations,  will  be  adjusted  in  accord- 
ance with  this  idea.  When  the  question  is  one  re- 
sulting from  the  natural  growth  and  expansion  of  a 
state,  the  struggle  becomes  inevitable. 

In  all  ages  war  has  established  the  land  marks 
of  history. 

"During  the  past  3,400  years  there  have  beec 
only  334  years  of  peace.  Nations  have  succeeded 
one  another  with  monotonous  similarity  in  their  rise, 
decline  and  fall. 


'  'Wars  victory  —  a  nation.  Wars —  destruction 
dissolution/' 

From  the  beginning,  nations  have  had  their 
origin  in  war.  "Their  periods  of  greatness  have 
been  coincident  with  their  military  prowess  and 
with  the  expansion  consequent  upon  it.  When  na- 
tions cease  to  expand  the  zenith  has 'been  reached. 
And  as  in  the  individual  there  is  no  standing  still  — 
so  with  nations  when  they  cease  to  grow  a  gradual 
decay  sets  in.  There  is  an  invariable  law  of  na- 
tional existence  that  the  boundaries  of  political  units 
are  stationary  only  momentarily—they  must  either 
expand  or  shrink.  It  is  by  this  law  of  expansion 
and  shrinkage  we  mark  the  rise  and  decline  of  na- 
tions." 

China  is  no  exception  to  this  law.  "Of  the 
twenty-five  dynasties  that  have  ruled  China,  each 
was  founded  by  a  soldier  and  each  in  due  time  heard 
from  surrounding  armies  the  melancholy  taps  of  its 
approaching  end."  The  effort  to  prevent  war  by 
arbitration  is  an  effort  to  substitute  transitory  and 
ephemeral  forces  for  those  which  are  immutable; 
changeless  to  all  except  very  great  periods  of  time. 
International  arbitration  fails  to  differentiate  be- 
tween the  sources  of  war  and  their  immediate  pre- 
cipitating causes.  Disputes  arising  between  nations 
are  generally  the  manifestations  of  a  deep  seated 
source  of  trouble  which  will  ultimately  lead  to  war. 
Sometimes  these  outward  manifestations  are  so 
widely  separated  from  the  coming  war  that  they 
seem  scarcely  connected  with  it.  And  again  they 
are  followed  so  closely  by  war  that  they  are  consid- 
ered its  cause. 

We  are  told  that  investigation  shows  that  when 
two  nations  go  to  war,  their  interests  have  for  years 
been  moving  along  converging  lines.  That  the  time 
of  the  approaching  war  is  fixed  by  the  angle  of 


—18— 

these  lines  of  convergence   and   the  rate  of  march 
along  them. 

These  lines  of  convergence  often  depend  on  the 
political  conditions  of  the  countries  involved.  Let 
this  be  illustrated  by  the  following  diagrams: 

Z_ 


Let  X  represent  a  country  which  has  in  the  be- 
ginning an  abundance  of  room,  natural  resources 
and  markets.  So  long  as  this  condition  exists,  little 
heed  is  given  outside  regions,  and  the  development 
moves  along  A-B  until  the  limits  of  home  resources 
are  being  reached.  When  this  occurs,  attention  is 
directed  toward  outside  regions  as,  for  example,  Z. 
When  a  second  nation  Y  is  similarly  situated  and  its 
attention  is  drawn  to  Z  as  an  advantageous  trading 
point,  the  lines  of  interest  of  X  and  Y  converge  on  Z. 
The  intensity  which  these  nations  are  travelling 
along  those  converging  lines  will  determine  the  time 
of  conflict.  Note  our  growing  interest  and  that  of 
other  nations  in  the  markets  of  South  America. 
Will  arbitration  be  able  to  pry  these  lines  of  con- 
vergence so  far  apart  as  to  prevent  war?  It  is  en- 
tirely safe  to  say  that  diplomatic  missions  will  not 
always  be  able  to  achieve  success  in  these  directions 
and  that  the  regulation  of  political  relations  will,  in 


—19— 

the  future  as  in  the  past,  be  carried  on  by  means  of 
war  when  they  have  passed  the  realms  of  diplomacy. 

The  intense  rivalry,  national  jealousies  and  race 
hatred  will  often  baffle  diplomatic  skill.  We  may, 
therefore,  assume  that  until  human  nature  has 
changed  and  the  present  law  of  the  growth,  contin- 
uance and  decay  of  nations  has  been  superseded, 
war  will  play  its  old  time  part  and  upon  it  will  be 
founded  the  birth  of  new  nations  and  destruction  of 
old. 

Foreign  writers  speak  of  the  inevitability  of  war 
and  the  necessity  of  being  prepared  for  it  as  being 
so  clear  as  to  be  transparent.  Since  war  is  the  con- 
tinuation of  political  aims  (politics  dependent  on  the 
law  of  growth)  with  no  superior  power  to  enforce 
the  decrees  of  courts  of  arbitration,  recourse  must  be 
had  to  this  court  of  last  resort.  In  casting  around 
for  a  means  of  preserving  peace  it  is  found  that  the 
best  safeguards  are  sound  military  organization.  If 
a  nation  builds  her  artificial  barriers  high  enough, 
another  nation  which,  by  the  laws  of  growth,  must 
burst  its  bounds,  will  find  its  line  of  least  resistance 
running  across  some  weaker  nation.  When  nations 
are  prepared  for  war,  the  result  of  collision  is  very 
great  and  there  is  a  corresponding  reluctance  to  enter 
upon  it.  A  weak  state  surrounded  by  stronger 
neighbors  invites  war,  and  the  author  states  that  if 
states  neglect  their  military  organization  from  false 
motives,  they  court  this  danger  from  their  own  su- 
pineness. 

What  constitutes  |the  strength  or  weakness  of 
nations?  When  we  apply  the  test  do  we  find  our 
own  nation  strong  or  weak?  The  idea  that  the  IL  S. 
is  a  strong  nation  prevails  among  the  greater  part 
of  its  inhabitants.  If  the  idea  of  war  with  any 
foreign  power  is  suggested,  it,  as  a  rule,  provokes  a 


—20— 

smile  coupled  with  some  remark  pointing  to  our  un- 
varying success  in  wars  of  the  past  and  of  our  un- 
limited resources  for  future  conflict.  Doubtless  our 
histories  are  largely  to  blame.  They  made  the  war 
of  1812  a  shining  example  of  success,  but  the  true 
story  of  the  conflict  is  to  us  both  interesting  and  un- 
pleasant. 

Our  wonderful  resources  and  vast  accumulated 
wealth  are  elements  of  potential  strength.  But  in 
order  that  they  may  be  of  real  use  in  an  emergency, 
they  must  be  called  into  play  long  before  the  out- 
break of  war.  It  is  a  far  cry  from  a  mountain  of 
ore  to  a  battleship.  Natural  resources  must  be 
greatly  transformed  before  they  become  available 
for  war.  The  hearings  before  the  military  sub-com- 
mittees show  how  largely  the  element  of  time  must 
be  considered  in  applying  our  •  wealth  and  resources 
to  the  purposes  of  war.  We  have  large  numbers  of 
men  out  of  which  to  manufacture  soldiers,  but  per- 
haps at  no  period  of  the  world's  history  have  train- 
ing and  organization  been  of  greater  importance 
than  at  the  present  day.  Strength  will  only  be  found 
in  numbers  when  combined  with  training  and  or- 
ganization. 

Great  accumulation  of  wealth  excites  the  cupidity 
of  others  and  is  perhaps  more  likely  to  be  the  ex- 
citing cause  of  war  than  a  remedy.  Our  attention  is 
often  called  to  the  patriotism  of  our  people,  and  no 
doubt  in  many  localities  it  is  of  high  order.  But 
does  it  surpass  that  of  the  Japanese,  for  instance, 
where  unlimited  numbers  are  always  willing  to  vol- 
unteer for  the  most  forlorn  hope?  Bravery  and 
courage,  too,  are  likewise  placed  among  our  assets. 
But  read  of  the  heroic  conduct  displayed  in  the 
present  great  war  can  we  hope  to  excel  in  these 
respects? 


—21— 

Napoleon  tells  us  that  poverty  and  privation 
are  the  best  schools  for  the  soldier.  In  this  respect 
the  schooling  of  the  American  soldier  has  been  bad. 
The  standard  of  living  is  too  high — meat  two  or 
three  times  per  day — good  clothing,  good  houses. 
It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  poverty  and  priva- 
tion must  not  be  such  as  to  destroy  the  physical 
strength.  I  once  visited  the  Cockerell  Iron  Works 
at  Serang— near  Liege,  Belgium.  I  saw  men  handling 
machinery  who  received  2  francs  75  centimes  per 
day  with  which  they  provided  for  their  families- 
black  bread,  coffee  without  sugar,  a  small  piece  of 
meat  on  Sunday — the  cheapest  sort  of  clothing.  Here 
we  find  the  schooling  for  the  soldier  pretty  good. 
The  Belgian  soldier  is  pretty  well  satisfied  with  a 
loaf  of  bread  for  his  ration. 

When  the  life  of  a  people  degenerates  into  the 
individual  scramble  for  accumulation  of  wealth,  it  is 
probable  that  success  brings  with  it  a  decay  of  mil- 
itary virtues.  Wealth  cannot  buy  (after  war  comes) 
battleships,  nor  as  a  rule  cannon,  nor  ammunition. 
Nor  can  it  at  any  time  purchase  patriotism  or  valor, 
or  courage  or  other  military  virtues. 

"With  wealth  comes  vanity;  with  vanity  ar- 
rogance; opulence  and  arrogance  provoke  war,  while 
at  the  same  time  the  nation  possessing  these  char- 
acteristics has  become  more  or  less  defenseless  and 
sooner  or  later  must  pay  the  penalty." 

It  is  true  the  cost  of  war  is  in  almost  direct  pro- 
portion to  the  accumulated  wealth  of  a  country. 
The  simple  ration,  clothing  and  small  pay  prevailing 
in  poor  countries  will  not  answer  in  a  country  like 
the  U.S.  Notwithstanding  the  effect  which  the  ac- 
cumulation of  wealth  has  on  individuals,  it  is  of 
almost  vital  importance  that  a  nation  on  going  to 
war  should  have  abundant  resources  at  its  command. 


—22— 

We   may   perhaps    enumerate    as    elements    of 
strength  in  any  nation: 

1.  Racial  homogeneity. 

2.  Sufficient  numbers  without  overcrowding. 

3.  Wealth  sufficient  to  provide  for  materials  and 
expenses  of  the  war,  but  not  of  such  proportions  that 
it  has  become  the  ruling  factor  in  individual  life. 

4.  Military  preparation  (which  means  increase  in 
military  value). 

5.  A  strong  government  capable  of  curbing. pop- 
ular passions. 

6.  Isolation. 

As  to  the  first  of  these,  homogeneity,  I  would 
like  to  relate  an  incident  out  of  my  experiences  dur- 
ing the  recent  Colorado  strikes.  I  took  the  first 
Federal  troops  to  Trinidad  where  the  situation  was 
very  tense.  Policemen  had  been  displaced  by 
strikers.  Many  properties  had  been  destroyed  and 
there  had  been  large  loss  of  life.  Not  long  after  my 
arrival  in  Trinidad  I  caused  the  strikers  to  be  as- 
sembled in  order  that  I  might  address  them.  Among 
other  things,  I  tried  to  impress  upon  them  the  great- 
ness of  the  U.  S.,  telling  them  that  the  small  number 
of  men  I  had  with  me  was  but  a  symbol  of  its  power 
and  authority,  and  that  as  large  a  force  as  needed 
would  be  sent  to  establish  and  maintain  order. 
Having  made,  as  I  thought,  my  point,  a  Greek 
striker  on  the  outside  of  the  crowd  was  heard  to  re- 
mark: "The  first  thing  we  know  the  United  States 
think  they  own  this  whole  damn  country!"  Men  of 
his  stamp  are  not  an  element  of  strength. 

ASSETS  AND  LIABILITIES 

Financial  institutions  render  periodic  statements 
of  assets  and  liabilities.  If  the  U.  S.  were  to  render 
a  similar  statement  as  to  the  assets  and  liabilities  of 
its  military  standing  some  might  say  "insolvent". 


—23— 

Among  the  liabilities  we  would  probably  find 
enumerated  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  Philippines, 
Hawaii,  Panama  Ganal,  hoarded  wealth,  nonhomo- 
genous  population,  unpreparedness,  etc.  On  the 
other  side  of  the  balance  sheet;  natural  resources, 
large  territory,  numerous  population,  patriotism, 
bravery,  etc.  To  the  military  man  the  balance  sheet 
would  be  quite  unsatisfactory.  There  are  two  ways 
in  which  it  might  be  made  to  present  a  better  show- 
ing. 1st.— By  decreasing  the  liabilities,  discarding 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  eliminating  all  colonies, 
giving  up  our  demands  for  an  open  door  in  China, 
surrendering  our  rights  as  to  the  freedom  of  the 
seas,  etc.  2d.~ Allow  the  liabilities  to  stand  and 
assess  the  stockholders  to  provide  ample  means  of 
defense.  The  assessment  must  be  made  before  war 
comes,  else  defeat  must  be  the  result.' 

The  best  military  organization,  according  to  Von 
der  Goltz,  is  that  which  renders  available  all  the  in- 
tellectual and  material  resources  of  the  country  in 
the  event  of  war.  Where  all  the  resources  of  men 
are  available  it  must  follow  that  many  are  not  trained 
to  a  high  degree  of  efficiency.  If  a  large  number  of 
untrained  men  are  called  into  the  service,  the  regular 
establishment  is  necessarily  weakened  by  the  details 
of  officers  to  look  after  the  increased  force;  if 
numbers  are  called  in  beyond  the  ability  to  provide 
for  their  instruction  and  control,  general  weakness 
will  result.  Bernhardi,  in  considering  this  subject, 
has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  greater  strength  will 
be  added  by  high  training  of  small  units.  The  news- 
papers tell  us  of  the  great  importance  that  Kitchner 
attached  to  the  training  of  soldiers.  A  large  part  of 
the  army  England  has  raised  is  still  in  England.  The 
fact  is,  the  value  of  untrained  troops  is  so  compar- 
atively small  that  Kitchener  seemed  willing  to  risk 


—24— 

defeat  rather  than  put  new  troops  in  until  they  have 
had  several  months  intensive  training. 

With  the  forms  of  organization  in  the  various 
countries,  you  are  more  or  less  familiar.  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  are  the  only  great 
powers  adhering  to  the  volunteer  system.  Both  of 
these  coun tries %have  believed  what  they  termed  their 
"splendid  isolation' '  gave  warrant  to  this  form  of 
raising  armies  both  in  peace  and  in  war. 

But  splendid  isolation  is  very  much  a  thing  of 
the  past.  The  English  Channel  has  grown  very 
narrow  by  reason  of  modern  means  of  transport, 
aerial  and  otherwise.  Oceans  have  shrunk  amazingly 
and  when  a  great  maritime  nation  once  gains  con- 
trol of  the  sea,  it  is  comparatively  an  easy  matter  to 
carry  on  overseas  expeditions.  The  size  of  a  single 
expedition  landed  would  depend  on  the  carrying 
capacity  of  the  ships  available.  Germany  is  cred- 
ited with  sufficient  shipping  to  embark  more  than 
300,000  men  at  one  time.  Isolation  must  therefore 
be  counted  on  less  and  less  as  a  guarantee  of  pro- 
tection. England  has  been  forced  to  the  conclusion 
that  compulsory  service  is  essential  to  the  safety  of 
the  nation,  and  in  the  United  States  that  idea  is  now 
appearing  and  receiving  much  consideration. 

I  believe  every  man  owes  a  certain  part  of  his 
life  to  the  government  which  protects  him;  that 
compulsory  service  is  the  only  fair,  just  and  demo- 
cratic way;  and  that  the  United  States  should  adopt 
a  method  of  raising  armies  more  in  accord  with  this 
idea,  the  size  of  the  army  to  be  proportioned  to  the 
necessity  of  the  case.  These  necessities  are  meas- 
ured by  the  degree  of  envy  and  cupidity  excited  in 
other  nations  on  account  of  its  accumulated  wealth 
and  by  the  intensity  with  which  it  is  travelling, 
with  other  nations,  along  convergent  lines  of  inter- 


ests.  At  present,  we  are  quite  lacking  in  reserve 
of  trained  men  with  which  to  strengthen  our  regular 
establishment  in  time  of  war.  Even  more  than  the 
lack  of  trained  men  will  be  felt  the  lack  of  trained 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers, 

THE    SPKCIAL  CHARACTERISTICS    OF    WAR    AT 
THE    PRESENT  TIMK 

The  statement  of  Von  der  Goltz  that  war  nowa- 
days generally  appears  in  its  natural  form,  i.e.,  as  a 
bloody  encounter  of  nations  in  which  each  contend- 
ing side  seeks  the  complete  defeat  or,  if  possible, 
the  destruction  of  the  enemy,  finds  vindication  in  the 
present  war,  as  well  as  in  the  two  or  three  preceding 
ones.  There  has  been  no  thought  of  gaining  success 
by  merely  massing  troops  on  the  borders  of  another 
state.  Rather  it  has  been  a  determination  to  come 
to  close  contact  and  bloody  decisions  from  the  start. 

Nations  following  the  precepts  of  Clausewitz 
realize  full  well  the  futility  of  going  to  war  with 
anything  less  than  their  entire  strength.  For  this 
reason  we  have  seen  the  increasing  military  budgets 
of  European  powers  and  a  corresponding  growth  in 
the  size  of  their  armies,  until  we  hear  of  the  ability 
of  European  nations  to  put  a  trained  army  of  from 
14,000,000  to  20,000,000  men  in  the  field. 

The  present  war  has  shown  the  futility  of  trying 
'4to  gain  victory  without  fighting  solely  by  dint  of 
maneuvering/'  Air  craft  is  perhaps  largely  re- 
sponsible for  the  decrease  in  the  value  of  maneuver. 
Large  masses  can  rarely  be  shifted  from  one  part  of 
a  battlefield  to  another  without  it  becoming  known 
to  the  adversary  in  time  to  permit  him  to  meet  the 
movement. 

It  therefore  becomes,  more  than  ever  before,  a 
matter  of  heavy  fighting  and  decisive  engagements 


—26— 

in  order  to  bring  success  to  one  side  or  the  other. 
Consequently,  in  countries  where  much  thought  has 
been  given  to  war,  we  find  states  putting  forth  their 
whole  strength  in  any  quarrel  in  which  they  may 
have  engaged.  Putting  forth  their  whole  strength 
does  not  necessarily  mean,  however,  that  every  man 
of  the  required  age  is  thrown  into  the  struggle. 
Many  must  be  retained  at  home  to  keep  the  routine 
administration  going.  Others  may  be  held  in  train- 
ing ready  •  to  replace  losses  and  to  strengthen  por- 
tions of  the  line  where  needed. 

The  putting  of  less  than  the  whole  strength  of  a 
country  into  a  quarrel  could  only  be  conceivable  in 
cases  of  great  disparity  in  strength,  trivial  causes, 
etc.  Sometimes  a  great  power  may  try  to  apply 
pressure  on  a  weaker  state,  to  bring  about  correction 
of  abuses,  by  sending  a  comparatively  small  force 
for  the  purpose— e.g.,  our  expeditionary  force  to 
Vera  Cruz.  Had  the  United  States  and  Mexico  been 
of  approximately  equal  strength,  war  would  have 
been  inevitable.  The  passions  of  the  people  would 
soon  have  been  roused  until  the  full  strength  of  both 
nations  would  have  been  brought  into  play. 

It  follows  that  in  modern  warfare  isolated  blows 
with  a  fraction  only  of  the  fighting  force  will  not 
answer  the  purpose.  Every  effort  must  be  put 
forth  to  compel  the  enemy  to  accept  the  desired 
terms  of  peace. 

War  therefore  takes  on  its  absolute  form  — the 
destruction  of  the  enemy  —  which  means  the  de- 
struction of  the  power  of  resistance  of  the  enemy. 
Even  in  its  absolute  form  it  does  not  mean  the  en- 
tire destruction  of  the  enemy's  forces.  The  loss  of  a 
portion  will  generally  make  a  sufficient  impression  on 
the  whole  mass  to  bring  about  the  desired  end. 
Napoleon  says  the  moral  is  to  the  physical  as  3  to  1. 


27 

A  rapid  defeat  of  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
enemy  will  bring  this  powerful  moral  force  into 
play.  When  the  destruction  has  proceeded  far 
enough,  the  enemy  will  feel  himself  unable  to  con- 
tinue the  struggle  and  peace  will  result. 


14  DAY  USE 

|  RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

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2T 


LD21-35m-8,'72 
(Q4189S10)476 — A-32 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


Gaylord  Bros. 

Maker* 


Syracuse. 
PAT.  JAN.  21. 


.  Y. 


04024 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


